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Abstract. This essay will examine the role of the Higher Education system in the UK, in educating students and 
communities about the concept of ‘othering’, and how they can combat ignorance of the benefits of multiculturalism 
and Freedom of Movement. Since the Referendum over membership of the EU (June 2016), hate crime and speech has 
soared in the UK –verbally and on social media– as have physical attacks on migrants and ethnic minorities. Recent 
research suggests that this increase has been fuelled by the language and images used in certain UK media.
This essay will therefore consider the impact of media ‘othering’ and what universities can, are, and might do to combat 
this rhetoric and action. It will consider current practices, policies, and posit future paths for Higher Education and 
governmental Education policy, in tackling xenophobia and Islamaphobia within the UK.
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[es] Educando al pueblo inglés: el rol de las universidades a la hora den enfrentar el 
discurso del odio y la islamofobia después del referéndum del Brexit.
Resumen. Este artículo examinará el rol de las universidades británicas al educar tanto a sus estudiantes como a las 
comunidades que las rodean sobre el “otro”, usando el multiculturalismo y el Movimiento por la Libertad para combatir 
la ignorancia hacia “el otro”. Desde que tuvo lugar el referéndum del Brexit en junio de 2016, se han incrementado 
considerablemente el discurso y los delitos basados en el odio hacia el “otro” en el Reino Unido, tanto a nivel verbal 
como a través de los medios de comunicación social, por no hablar de las agresiones de carácter físico hacia inmigrantes y 
minorías étnicas. Los estudios más recientes sobre este fenómeno social indican que este incremento ha sido claramente 
avivado por las imágenes y el lenguaje exhibidos en los medios de comunicación británicos.
Por lo tanto, el objetivo de este artículo es considerar el impacto de los medios de comunicación en la conceptualización del 
“otro” y explorar qué están haciendo las universidades británicas para enfrentar esta retórica y acciones. Consideraremos 
prácticas y políticas actuales y las posibles alternativas que las universidades pueden adoptar, así como las políticas que el 
gobierno podría implantar para contrarrestar tanto la xenofobia en general como la islamofobia en particular a nivel nacional.
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1. The ‘EU Referendum in Context’
It was in January 2013 that David Cameron, 
then UK Prime Minister, declared his intention 
to hold a referendum on the UK’s relationship 
with the European Union. In a speech delivered 
at the Bloomberg headquarters, he detailed the 
Conservative party’s intention –if re-elected– 
first to renegotiate that relationship, and then 
to call a referendum on that membership2. The 
United Kingdom European Union Membership 
Referendum (also known as the EU Referen-
dum) was held on 23 June 2016 in the UK and 
Gibraltar, in order to gauge whether or not the 
electorate wished to continue the UK’s mem-
bership of the EU, positing the question within 
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a stark either/or framework: Leave or Remain. 
The EU referendum campaign began on 15 
April 2016, with the result announced on Friday 
24 June, the day after the referendum.
Voter turnout was 72.2%, with 51.9% of those 
who voted in favour of leaving (with a standard 
deviation of 10.4% across UK local authority 
areas).3 Under-18s were not eligible to vote; of 
those 18-24 year olds who voted, 74% voted to 
Remain in the EU.4 Concerns about immigration 
and ‘the loss of a distinct national identity’ were 
two significant factors influencing voters who 
chose ‘Leave’.5 Since then, studies have noted 
how fears articulated over immigration and mul-
ticulturalism were prominent among voters with 
lower levels of education (and no experience 
within Higher Education).6 London, along with 
other large, multicultural cities with significant 
numbers of undergraduates and graduates, voted 
in the majority for ‘Remain’.7
1.1. Hate Crime in the UK
Under UK law, a hate crime is defined as ‘any 
criminal offence which is perceived, by the vic-
tim or any other person, to be motivated by hos-
tility or prejudice towards someone based on a 
personal characteristic.’8 There are five centrally 
monitored strands of hate crime: race or ethnici-
ty, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation, disabil-
ity, and transgender identity. This article consid-
ers ‘hate crime’ within the first two categories.
Home Office statistical analysis of hate 
crime related to race/religion for 2014/15 re-
3 S.O. Becker, T. Fetzer, and D. Novy, ‘Who Voted for Brex-
it? A comprehensive district-level analysis’ in Economic 
Policy, 32 (2017): 601-650, at 611.
4 See S.B. Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a di-
vided continent’ in Journal of European Public Policy, 23 
(2016): 1259-1277 and Hortense Goulard, ‘Britain’s youth 
voted Remain’: https://www.politico.eu/article/britains-
youth-voted-remain-leave-eu-brexit-referendum-stats/ [last 
accessed 1 August 2018].
5 Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote’, p. 1273. See also N. Lee, K. Mor-
ris and T. Kemeny, ‘Immobility and the Brexit vote’, Cam-
bridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society (2018): 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86367/ [last accessed 1 August 2018].
6 Ibid. See also Peter Moore, ‘How Britain Voted’: https://
yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ [last ac-
cessed 20 October 2018].
7 See, for example, Financial Times, 24 June 2016: https://
ig.ft.com/sites/elections/2016/uk/eu-referendum/ [last ac-
cessed 1 August 2018].
8 H. Corcoran, D. Lader and K. Smith, UK Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 
2014/15, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/467366/hosb0515.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2018].
veals 42,930 race hate crimes (82% of overall 
hate crime), and 3,254 (6%) in which religion 
was deemed the specific motivating factor.9 This 
sentence had been deleted in the final version.10 
For 2016/17 –which includes the period sur-
rounding the EU Referendum– figures revealed 
a significant increase. Racially-motivated crime 
had risen to 62,685 reported crimes (a rise of 
27%), and 5,949 crimes for which religion was 
deemed the motivating factor (a rise of 35%). 
As a Home Office report acknowledges, 
‘part of the increase since 2015/16 is due to a 
genuine increase in hate crime, particularly 
around the time of the EU Referendum in June 
2016’.11 The report also notes that some hate 
crimes could ‘be motivated by hostility to-
wards the victim’s race and religion’, and such 
crimes are duly accounted for in the providing 
breakdown, since ‘[a]round five per cent of 
hate crime offences in 2016/17 are estimated to 
have involved more than one motivating factor, 
the majority of these were hate crimes related 
to both race and religion.’12 Specifically, the 
report’s analysis details ‘a clear spike in hate 
crime’ during June and July 2016.13 Further 
evidence reveals that such crimes have consis-
tently risen in the aftermath of key events, such 
as the Lee Rigby14 murder in July 2013, and the 
Charlie Hebdo15 shooting in January 2015, with 
the highest recorded spike (nearly double that of 
the spike following Rigby’s murder) occurring 
after the EU Referendum.16 Greater nuance of 
these findings were reported by the Office for 
9 Corcoran, Lader and Smith, Hate Crime 2014/15 2.1 Preva-
lence and Trends
10 A. O’Neill, UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Hate 
Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17, available at: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-
1617-hosb1717.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2018]. 2.1 
Prevalence and Trends (table 2).
11 O’Neill, Hate Crime 2016/17, 2.1, p. 4.
12 Ibid.
13 O’Neill, Hate Crime 2016/17, Table 2.2, p. 6.
14 Fusilier Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was 
attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael 
Adebowale near the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, 
southeast London. For analysis of the motivations behind 
and impact of this case see T. McEnery, M. McGlashan and 
R. Love, ‘Press and social media reaction to ideologically 
inspired murder: The case of Lee Rigby’ in Discourse and 
Communication 9 (2015): 237-259; I. Awan and M. Rah-
man, ‘Portrayals of Muslims Following the Murders of Lee 
Rigby in Woolwich and Mohammed Saleem in Birming-
ham: A Content Analysis of UK Newspapers’ in Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 36 (2016): 16-31. 
15 See J. Britton, Muslims, Racism and Violence after the Par-
is Attacks in Sociological Research Online 20 (2015): 1-6.
16 O’Neill, Hate Crime 2016/17, Figure 2.2.
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National Statistics, which noted a direct corre-
lation between hate crime against migrants and 
Muslims, and the outcome of the Referendum.17 
Another significant spike in hate crime (even 
higher than that recorded around the Referen-
dum) occurred in the aftermath of the Finsbury 
Park Mosque attack on 19 June 2017.18
1.2. The Media and Hate Crime
Academic, political and journalistic concerns 
have been raised over the impact of newspaper 
headlines and articles in the lead up to and after 
the EU Referendum, and a variety of studies 
and campaigns were launched to consider any 
potential correlations between press editorials, 
the outcome of the Referendum, and the in-
crease in hate crime. In August 2016, Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism released 
their report, ‘UK Press Coverage of the EU 
Referendum’, which concluded that newspa-
per ‘coverage was heavily skewed towards the 
Leave camp’, with ‘immigration’ proving to be 
the most significant issue raised.19 Academic 
research findings have reinforced the ways in 
which the UK press dominated and controlled 
much of public debate about EU membership. 
Paul Rowinski’s assessment of prejudicial lan-
guage in the UK media is a case in point: 
Initial linguistic analysis has established a dis-
cursive construction, prevalent in the main-
stream mainly right-of-centre national newspa-
pers in the weeks running up to the referendum, 
claiming to “take back our country”; “regain 
control”… the main conduit for the articulation 
of [these] notions is immigration. It is argued 
that never before in living memory have some 
17 O’Neill, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17. See also 
D. Devine, ‘Hate crime did spike after the referendum – 
even allowing for other factors’, The London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science Blog, 19 March 2018: http://
blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/19/hate-crime-did-spike-
after-the-referendum-even-allowing-for-other-factors/ [last 
accessed 18 August 2018].
18 On 19 June 2017 Darren Osborne drove a van into pedes-
trians in Finsbury Park, London, near the Muslim Welfare 
House, 100 yards from Finsbury Park Mosque. One victim 
of the attack died, and at least nine others were injured. See: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42910051 [last accessed 
21 August 2018].
19 D.A.L. Levy, B. Aslan and D. Bironzo, ‘UK Press Coverage 
of the EU Referendum’ (Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism in association with PRIME Research, 2016), pp. 
34-35; available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.
uk/sites/default/files/2018-11/UK_Press_Coverage_of_
the_%20EU_Referendum.pdf 
 [last accessed 22 August 2018].
newspapers fed the public’s hopes, fears and 
yes prejudice against Europe (and Europeans) 
to this extent. They have tapped into a selective 
collective memory, the resulting common sense 
presuppositions and ignorance. Some newspa-
pers have acted irresponsibly, have damaged 
our democracy and played a pivotal role in cre-
ating the crisis we now face.20 
As the ‘fourth power (or estate)’, the media 
in the UK and across the West ‘has enormous 
impact’ on public behaviour, as Joana Kosho 
detailed on the eve of the UK’s EU Referen-
dum. Immigration remains ‘a complex phe-
nomenon’ but public ‘knowledge, attitudes 
and the impressions on immigration are con-
structed by continuous information from the 
media’ in the UK; her timely study noted ‘neg-
ative discourse’ as predominate across several 
news outlets, with ‘negative terminology on 
immigrants focused on the key words like ‘il-
legal’, ‘terrorist’, etc.’ having considerable im-
pact upon public perception.21
Public and individual concerns were also 
raised on social media and galvanised during 
the aftermath of the EU Referendum. In Au-
gust 2016, the Stop Funding Hate campaign 
was launched in the wake of the increase in 
hate crime, after the EU Referendum.22 The 
campaign’s aim is to persuade substantial 
companies with offices in the UK to desist 
advertising in (both on- and offline) newspa-
pers that utilise headlines and language that 
have the potential to fuel hate crime. Three 
key newspapers targeted by the campaign, by 
way of example, are the The Sun, The Daily 
Mail and The Express, who regularly produce 
anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, which 
demonstrably increased in the lead up to and 
after the Referendum.23 
Responses to this persistent and increased 
anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, includ-
20 P. Rowinski, ‘Mind the gap: the language of prejudice 
and the press omissions that led a people to the precipice’ 
(2016), available at: www.referendumanalysis.eu [last ac-
cessed 29 August 2018].
21 J. Kosho, ‘Media Influence on Public Opinion Attitudes 
Toward The Migration Crisis’ in International Journal of 
Scientific and Technology Research 5 (2016): 90.
22 I am grateful to Richard Wilson, the founder of Stop Fund-
ing Hate, for our discussions about hate speech in the UK 
media, and its ramifications for society.
23 According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (UK), The 
Sun is the UK’s largest-selling newspaper (circulation: 
1,787,096), with The Daily Mail in second place (1,511, 
357). The Express’ circulation in December 2016 was 
335,271. (abc.org.uk)
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ed The Body Shop: the company was persuad-
ed by customer action and the Stop Funding 
Hate campaign to stop advertising with The 
Daily Mail, a decision that followed hot on the 
heels of a similar decision by Lego. The Body 
Shop released a statement saying that it had 
listened to concerns, and noting their own con-
cerns about the newspaper’s editorial stance: 
“We have always supported human rights –it 
is part of our Enrich Not Exploit Commit-
ment– and when an editorial stance seems to 
go against that Commitment, we consider se-
riously whether we will support it.”24 No fur-
ther adverts for The Body Shop occurred in 
The Daily Mail or The Mail on Sunday after 11 
December 2016. Similarly in 2016, Specsav-
ers Optical Group Ltd (a British optical retail 
chain) withdrew an advert from the Daily Ex-
press after pressure from the public and Stop 
Funding Hate complained that the newspaper 
was funding “fear and division”.25 (Their ad-
vert had appeared alongside the headline ‘New 
Migrant Rush to Britain. Calais refugees in 
race from Jungle’ [7 September 2016].)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Daily Mail 
have utilised their news portals to attack such 
campaign’s against their lexical choices. Daily 
Mail columnist Guy Adams, did not pull any 
punches or word, in his article attacking Stop 
Funding Hate, as their campaign continued to 
make advances in public and business consid-
erations throughout 2017. Adams used his on-
line column to attack ‘The real hatemongers: 
A tiny bunch of zealots called Stop Funding 
Hate are trying to gag Britain’s free press. This 
exposé reveals the vile abuse and incitement 
to violence spewed out by THEIR supporters 
against Tories and Brexiteers’.26 It is not diffi-
cult to identify his attempt to deflect accusa-
tions back upon his accusers; the lexical choice 
of ‘zealots’ adding a religious edge to the mix.
The Daily Mail has a demonstrable track 
record of openly attacking any establishment 
or campaign that appears to counter its regular 
24 ee G. Bowden, ‘The Body Shop Becomes Latest Com-




25 Aubrey Allegretti (15 September 2016). “Specsavers Apolo-
gises And Pulls Daily Express Advert After Customers’ Re-
volt”. Huffington post UK. Retrieved 4 November 2016.
26 G. Adams, ‘The real hatemongers…’, The Mail Online (25 
November 2017) available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-5115651/Stop-Funding-Hate-trying-gag-Brit-
ains-free-press.html [last accessed 29 August 2018].
anti-immigration, anti-Muslim rhetoric. This 
includes universities. Such articles include 
James Slack’s 2011 piece, ‘40 UK univer-
sities are now breeding grounds for terror as 
hardline groups peddle hate on campus’.27 The 
article strongly implies that universities were 
enablers of terrorism and the actual promoters 
of hate speech in British society. Universities 
have been quick to counter any such accusa-
tions made against them individually or col-
lectively, and in 2015, following on from the 
launch of the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act, the Department for Education introduced 
specific ‘Prevent’ guidelines and requirements, 
to safeguard against any possibility of ena-
bling terrorism on UK soil. Further revisions 
were made to this policy.28 The Daily Mail did 
not pass comment on these measures. 
Having examined a rise in hate crime in the 
UK in the wake of the EU Referendum, and 
the impact of media anti-immigrant and an-
ti-Muslim rhetoric, we will now turn our atten-
tion to the ways in which UK universities have 
responded to this rise in hate crime. First, we 
will examine the sector-wide analysis of the 
impact of hate crime on students in the UK, 
and what universities and students might do 
to tackle or prevent it on campuses and in so-
ciety more widely. After this, we will explore 
the impact such assessments and guidance has 
had in real terms. (Section III will then posit 
ways in which universities could tackle both 
hate speech in society and in the media, and 
promote social cohesion and fact checking.)
2. Tackling Hate Crime in UK Universities: 
Calls for Change in 2016
Universities UK (UUK) is an advocacy organ-
isation for universities in the United Kingdom. 
The president is now Julia Buckingham Janet 
Beer, the vice-chancellor of the University of 
27 J. Slack, ‘40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for 
terror as hardline groups peddle hate on campus’ (which in-
cludes Brunel University), Daily Mail, 6 June 2011: https://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394625/40-UK-uni-
versities-breeding-grounds-terror.html [last accessed 18 
August 2018].
28 HM Government, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for Eng-
land and Wales (2016); available at: https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guid-
ance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf [last accessed 18 
August 2018]. For reservations about this policy, see Henk 
Van Houtum and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy, cited below, n. 70.
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Liverpool. Its mission is to support the work 
of universities and promote their interests, 
by providing information about best practice 
across the Higher Education sector. In 2015, 
the organisation set up a Taskforce to assess 
three key concerns: violence against women, 
harassment and hate crime affecting universi-
ty students. The Taskforce met four times over 
a 12-month period, and considered a wealth 
of evidence presented by individual universi-
ties, the National Union of Students, and oth-
er organisations, such as Rape Crisis (https://
rapecrisis.org.uk), Tell MAMA (https://tell-
mamauk.org), the Union of Jewish Students 
(https://www.ujs.org.uk), and Stonewall 
(www.stonewall.org.uk). A findings report was 
issued in 2016, which presented recommenda-
tions on how to respond to and prevent these 
three key issues.29 This section deals with the 
formation and recommendations of that re-
port; 2.1 details their follow-on report about 
responses to and evidence for the implementa-
tion of these recommendations, one year later.
Chapter 1 of Changing the Culture situates 
the initiative within the ‘UK Policy Context’, 
and provides an ‘Overview of the evidence 
considered by the UUK Taskforce’.30 In a 
policy context, central to this inquiry was the 
UK government’s own plan for tackling hate 
crime, Action Against Hate, which was re-
leased in July 2016, and updated in 2018.31
Crime and harassment as two key areas of 
concern for UK government policy. The UUK 
report also highlighted these concerns –along ith 
violence against women– as in need of assess-
ment within universities, since ‘[u]niversities 
are a microcosm of society and therefore ffected 
by these same problems’.32 UUK raised con-
29 Universities UK, Changing the culture: Report of the Uni-
versities UK Taskforce examining violence against women, 
harassment and hate crime affecting university students 
(October 2016); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.
ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2016/chang-
ing-the-culture.pdf [last accessed 2 October 2018]. 
30 HM Government, Changing the Culture, pp. 14-17 and 17-
26 respectively.
31 HM Government, Action Against Hate. The UK Govern-




Hate_Crime_2016.pdf [last accessed: 20 August 2018]. Their 
update – ‘Two Years On’ is available at: https://assets.pub-
lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/748175/Hate_crime_refresh_2018_FI-
NAL_WEB.PDF [last accessed: 21 August 2018].
32 HM Government, Action Against Hate, p. 17.
cerns about the lack of identification of student 
victims within governmental data but acknowl-
edged its usefulness in revealing, for example, 
that London attacks frequently occur in areas 
of access to public transport and close to major 
thoroughfares. As such, it does provide universi-
ties with a variety of ‘off campus’ data, of which 
management could make students aware.
The UUK report raises a number of rec-
ommendations as to how universities can re-
spond to harassment and hate crime (as well 
as acknowledging the intersectionality  of hate 
crimes). These are, in the main, based on ev-
idence presented by the above-named groups, 
as well as the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU), 
which examined student and staff experience 
within a university context. However, through-
out the report, the recommendations frequently 
blur all three concerns (violence against wom-
en, harassment and hate crime), which can 
prove problematic, as we shall see. For exam-
ple, the Executive Summary notes that the rec-
ommendations include: ‘use of evidence-based 
bystander initiative programmes and facilitat-
ing a culture of zero tolerance. This activity 
will have knock-on benefits for wider society 
given the large numbers of students who pro-
gress through the UK’s higher education sys-
tem.’33 The ‘bystander nitiative’ recommenda-
tion is inspired by research undertaken at the 
University of the West of England (UWE) in 
conjunction with Public Health England into 
violence against women.34 As commendable 
as this is, the emphasis remains on violence 
against women, rather than all three concerns. 
This weighting, as we shall see, may inadvert-
ently have had consequences for those in re-
ceipt of its observations and recommendations.
This merging of initiatives frequently em-
phasises sexual assault the primary concern, 
thereby developing more specific recommen-
dations in this area, and reducing space giv-
en to the latter two categories. The length of 
dedicated analysis and discussion of violence 
against women is double that for harassment 
and hate crime combined.35 Elsewhere, the 
33 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 5.
34 Fenton, R. A., Mott, H. L., McCartan, K. and Rumney, P. 
(2014). The Intervention Initiative. Bristol: UWE and Public 
Health England. Available at: www.uwe.ac.uk/bl/research/
InterventionInitiative [last accessed 20 October 2018].
35 Chapter 4: ‘Responding to Harassment and Hate Crime’ 
is four pages in length; Chapter 5: ‘Achieving a Universi-
ty-Wide Response to Incidents of Sexual Violence’ covers 
eight pages. The same weighting is evidential throughout 
the whole of the report.
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phraseology frequently elides harassment and 
hate crime: ‘The Taskforce agreed at the outset 
that consideration should be given to address-
ing violence against women as well as harass-
ment and hate crime.’36 Similarly, the use of 
examples often only utilises findings in the 
first category: ‘The evidence gathered by the 
Taskforce showed that some universities are 
already implementing high-level strategies to 
address violence against women, harassment 
and hate crime. One example is Durham Uni-
versity’s Sexual Violence Taskforce…’37 Over-
all, the report’s conclusion is that universities 
need to take ‘an institutionwide approach’ to 
addressing all three areas of concern but the 
report itself gives primacy throughout to one 
of the three categories under scrutiny.38 
For hate crime and harassment, the recom-
mendations focus upon recording individual, 
distinct cases, since ‘universities should be 
aware, and develop an understanding of, the 
intersectionality of incidents.’ 
An incident of harassment or hate crime can be 
carried out on the basis of a number of different 
characteristics which a person presents, and the 
victim may feel attacked, offended or humili-
ated on the basis of any or all of these. These 
characteristics are also likely to interact and 
shape how a student victim responds to an inci-
dent of harassment or hate crime. It is therefore 
important to be aware and to respond to each 
incident and to each individual on the particular 
circumstances of the case. This can also have 
implications for how incidents are recorded. 
Recording systems therefore need to be effec-
tive enough so as to accurately capture the true 
nature of a particular incident. This will allow 
universities to monitor any trends that may indi-
cate specific problems affecting their students.39 
It is worth noting that for hate crime and 
harassment, the report focuses on the feelings 
of the student –the emotional response– rath-
er than the fact that such attacks are criminal. 
This latent emphasis on feelings in these latter 
two categories concords with research under-
taken by Jessica Gagnon. The recent increase 
in hate crime and (racially and religiously fo-
cused) harassment often receives different lex-
36 [My emphasis.] P. 63.
37 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 57.
38 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 106.
39 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 46.
ical choices in official reports when describ-
ing student responses. In her examination of 
‘social construction of student activists and 
the limits of student engagement’ Gagnon re-
veals the ways in which university responses 
to student concerns about nationalism and, in 
particular, the rise in hate crime after the EU 
Referendum, are often pushed to ‘the edges of 
engagement’ through constructs of emotion, 
rather than detailing their rights within the law 
or university policy.40
Changing the Culture was commissioned 
after the Conservative Party’s manifesto dec-
laration that an EU Referendum would take 
place but before it occurred. The report was 
issued roughly four months after the decision 
to Leave, and does accommodate the impact 
of the EU Referendum in one short section of 
Chapter 1, ‘Setting the Scene: the Nature and 
Scale of the Problem’ (section 53):
Hate crime following the EU referendum
The result of the UK referendum on member-
ship of the European Union held in June 2016 
coincided with an increase in the number of 
reported race hate crimes. The Metropolitan 
Police –the UK’s largest police force– report-
ed a rise in the number of incidents, with 599 
race hate crimes reported between 24 June and 
2 July 2016. This equates to an average of 67 
reports a day, a rise of more than 50% on the 
previous average of 44. [n.52 in report] Na-
tionally, figures for the days immediately fol-
lowing the referendum result suggested a 57% 
increase in reported incidents for the same 
days four weeks earlier. [n.53] Data published 
by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in Sep-
tember 2016 showed a 49% rise in incidents in 
the last week in July when compared with the 
same week the previous year. The following 
week saw a 58% increase on last year to 1,787 
recorded incidents. [n. 54] Following the result 
on 24 June 2016, the Muslim Council of Britain 
also compiled a dossier of reported racist and 
anti-Muslim incidents. The impact of this single 
event highlights the need for universities to be 
aware of, and responsive to, geopolitical events, 
and how particular student communities may be 
affected by them.
40 J. Gagnon, ‘Unreasonable rage, disobedient dissent: the 
social construction of student activists and the limits of stu-
dent engagement’ in Learning and Teaching 11 (2018): 82-
108 (citation at 85).








ling-hate-crime-remains-a-priority [news from 
the National Police Chief’s Council]
It is interesting to note that notes 52 and 53 of 
the UUK report cite British broadsheet newspa-
pers as their sources (The Independent and The 
Guardian), rather than any academic or govern-
mental study. The Guardian is noted by Lecy, 
Aslan and Bironzo (cited above) as having been 
demonstrably pro-Remain during the lead up 
to and after the EU Referendum. Although not 
included in their study, The Independent is gen-
erally held to maintain editorials that align with 
the values espoused by The Guardian. By plac-
ing this information in a subsection it isolates 
this evidence for a rise in hate crime recom-
mendations within the report, thereby making 
no recommendation as to how staff and students 
might guard against hate crimes motivated by 
the Leave result or, indeed, how to respond to 
them, or ways in which they might comprehend 
the motivating factors involved.
The report does include 14 Case Studies, 
which elucidate some of the initiatives under-
taken to date in the UK, with one study (#3) 
considering evidence from the United States 
of America. Of these reports, nine deal with 
sexual assault, one on methodologies for tack-
ling antisocial behaviour and discrimination 
in sport (#2), one identifying the benefits of 
working with police liaison officers (#8), and 
another on diversity and inclusion (#7). Case 
Study 7, the University of Manchester’s online 
‘Report and Support’ platform provides use-
ful guidance on methodologies for reporting 
and reducing key antisocial behaviour, since 
‘everyone is responsible for ending bullying, 
harassment, sexual harassment and discrimi-
nation’.41
Case Study 6 is of particular interest to 
the parameters of this current essay. It is the 
only case study to make mention of the impact 
of information in the media. The study de-
tails Nottingham Trent University’s ‘Respect 
at NRU. Give it. Get it. Expect it.’ This is a 
campaign created to launch the University’s 
41 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 100.
internal Dignity and Respect Policy. The Case 
Study details the rationale for the project:
The policy sets out the university’s commitment 
to an inclusive and positive environment and ar-
ticulates the university’s expectations regarding 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviours and the 
consequences of not adhering to the policy. It 
makes clear that all members of the NTU com-
munity are responsible for contributing to an 
environment free from unacceptable behaviours 
such as intimidation, harassment, bullying and 
victimisation. The policy applies to staff, stu-
dents and visitors to the university.42
The policy was launched in 2015 and com-
menced with ‘a multi-faceted communications 
strategy using social media, student newsletters 
and web pages, as well as communications from 
senior leadership.’ This included: eNews to all 
staff, and ‘student newsletter and web news ar-
ticles’.43 It is inferred that these web-based news 
articles refer to material released by the univer-
sity, readily accessible on the internet; indeed: 
there are many such opportunities for accessing 
news about this initiative, providing clear guid-
ance on policy and a positive response to an in-
creasing problem with the UK.44 
The main webpage for the initiative also 
provides access to clear guidelines on how 
to report a hate crime via the university or in 
combination with the Police.45 It also provides 
straightforward access information for Student 
Support Services. The emphasis throughout is 
on the legal implications of such crimes, how to 
report an incident (as a witness or victim), and 
on support services for victims. Procedures for 
staff are also transparent. What we see here then 
a blended approach to prevention and response.
Having examined the aims and content of 
UUK’s Changing the Culture initial report in 
2016, published shortly after the EU Referen-
dum, we will now consider the evidence for re-
sponses to their recommendations provided in 
their follow-up report. This report provides ex-
tensive analysis of the ways in which UK uni-
42 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, pp. 98-99.
43 Universities UK, Changing the Culture, p. 99.
44 Nottingham Trent University, ‘Respect at NTU. Give it. 
Get it. Expect it.’: https://www4.ntu.ac.uk/equality-diver-
sity-inclusion/policies-procedures/dignity-respect/index.
html [last accessed 20 October 2018].
45 Nottingham Trent University, ‘Practical support for students 
who have experienced a hate crime or incident’: http://
www4.ntu.ac.uk/student_services/individual_support/hate-
crimes/index.html [last accessed 20 October 2018].
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versities have responded to sexual misconduct, 
harassment and hate crime, during a period in 
which Article 50 was triggered, setting a two-
year time period in which the UK and EU had 
to negotiate a deal (which was ultimately ex-
tended and enacted on 31 January 2020). Dur-
ing this period, it should be remembered, Brex-
it was front and centre in UK news media, and 
it is this period in which that increase in hate 
crimes was acknowledged, as detailed above.46
2.1. Universities UK follow-on report - 2017
Dame Janet Beer opens this follow-on report 
with her firm conviction that ‘our universities 
have a significant role to play in driving cultural 
change to help combat the pernicious problem 
of harassment and violence in our society to-
day.’47 The Key Findings of the Executive Sum-
mary, however, report details that there remains 
much still to be done in responding to and pre-
venting sexual misconduct, hate crime and har-
assment. The Executive Summary reveals how 
‘This study found elements of good practice in 
how providers are tackling sexual misconduct, 
hate crime and harassment, which others may 
find it helpful to know about and possibly learn 
from in developing their own approaches.’ The 
report goes on to deliver a further set of recom-
mendations, ‘based on this good practice.’48
However, the Executive Summary also con-
cedes that ‘[t]o date, the majority of higher ed-
ucation providers have focussed predominantly 
on tackling student sexual misconduct’.49 The 
report elsewhere acknowledges this imbalance 
in more detail, which, for our present assess-
ment of response and provision to tackle hate 
speech and its causes, is worth citing in full:
Most higher education providers are focussed 
predominantly on preventing and responding to 
student-to-student sexual misconduct. A great 
deal of good emerging practice is evident in this 
area and UUK has been active both in its own 
well-received thought leadership in this area, 
46 For a succinct explanation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Trea-
ty, which sets out the protocols for leaving the European 
Union, see Oliver, Understanding Brexit, pp. 136-37.
47 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On. An 
Assessment of strategies to tackle sexual misconduct, hate 
crime and harassment affecting university students (March 
2018); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/pol-
icy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2018/changing-the-
culture-one-year-on.pdf [last accessed: 21 October 2018].
48 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 10.
49 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 7.
and in facilitating the sharing and dissemination 
of this emerging good practice across the sector. 
Conversely, tackling hate incidents and crime 
and staff-to-student misconduct tend to have a 
lower priority, and policies and campaigns are 
less well-developed in these areas within most 
of the providers in this study –as is the data col-
lected on these areas. A minority of providers 
plan to address either or both of these areas 
as a next stage [my emphasis]. Other ongoing 
research and student campaigns on these areas 
are likely to continue raising awareness of these 
issues. Both require further support and time 
to achieve the same step change and enhanced 
priority status within providers [my emphasis] 
as that of student-to-student sexual misconduct. 
‘Student sexual misconduct has been the focus 
of our work which has been given special em-
phasis [since the publication of the Taskforce’s 
report]. We do have processes for hate crime 
and harassment, we have always had these 
within equality statements’.– Senior Sponsor: 
large, post-92 institution 
‘Hate crime is the area lacking information on … 
there is an issue for students of not knowing where 
to report an incident to –is it the police or the uni-
versity? There is also an issue of students from 
certain areas not coming forward… We need to 
create an environment where it is talked about.’– 
Student President: large, post-92 institution 
‘Student-to-student issues seem to be easier to 
deal with, I am only aware of anecdotal com-
plaints against staff not of any detail.’ – Student 
President: large, research-intensive institution 
‘We keep statistics on student misconduct, but 
we can’t produce similar data on staff inci-
dents…’ – Senior Manager: large, research-in-
tensive institution 
Changing organisational culture takes time 
to become apparent and is difficult to meas-
ure. Higher education providers recognise that 
changes to policies and procedures must be 
backed up by addressing all the recommen-
dations to achieve cultural change. However, 
many of the participants in this study have ex-
perienced considerable increases in the number 
of students disclosing recent or historic inci-
dents of sexual misconduct. This is considered 
positively as evidence that students are more 
confident in coming forward due to the changes 
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being made. There is some concern among larg-
er institutions particularly of the need to have 
appropriate processes, procedures and staffing 
levels in place to support the potential sharp in-
crease in the volume of disclosures.50
If effect, those responding to and summa-
rising attempts at ‘changing the culture’ of hate 
speech within British society, have not priori-
tised it, have not given its consideration parity 
with sexual misconduct, and so concede that 
the ‘culture’ of hate rhetoric within UK soci-
ety remains in need of further assessment and 
greater response – both from society as a whole 
and within the Higher Education system.
This is perhaps unsurprising. The initial re-
port in effect prioritises addressing sexual mis-
conduct through its presentational imbalance, 
and therefore could well have (unintentional-
ly) precipitated such an imbalanced response.. 
The One Year On report does remain emphat-
ic that the duty of care to students continues 
to demand that ‘Higher education providers... 
ensure that their students have a safe environ-
ment in which they can live, work and study, 
and this applies whether they are physically on 
campus, in student accommodation, undertak-
ing placements or overseas study, participating 
in sports or social activities away from campus, 
or studying online.’51 This re-emphasis upon 
safety within and beyond campus is highly 
commendable but continues to fail in any de-
tailed assessment of the root causes and loca-
tions pertinent to hate speech, hate crime, and 
harassment (in the parameters of this article: 
specifically crimes of anti-non-White-British, 
anti-non-English-Christian harassment and 
hate speech). As such, it is reactionary, rather 
than seeking preventative strategies in any 
comparable measure.
So if the emphasis is upon reacting to 
events that have occurred, what does it have to 
say about known increases in harassment and 
non-sexual crime during this period? Section 
2.1.3 of the follow-on report (‘The context 
since 2016’) does provide some subtle indica-
tors that the Taskforce are aware of particular 
types of inappropriate behaviours and crimes 
that have escalated since the EU Referendum 
but they are by no means explicit:
50 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, pp. 
22-23.
51 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 14.
Since the publication of Changing the culture 
in 2016, UUK has developed a programme of 
work to support providers in implementing the 
recommendations. This includes promoting the 
recommendations at a range of external confer-
ences, hosting its own annual conference and 
other events and developing resources to sup-
port, promote and disseminate innovative and 
good practice, including through a directory of 
case studies. In addition, UUK is supporting a 
range of specific initiatives, such as the provi-
sion of practical support on implementing the 
UUK/Pinsent Masons Guidance, and on tack-
ling issues of staff-to-student sexual miscon-
duct, faith-based [my emphasis] harassment and 
cyber-bullying. UUK has also developed a com-
munications plan to promote a positive narrative 
about the role higher education providers are 
playing to prevent and respond to harassment in 
all its forms. The issues considered by the Task-
force’s report continue to have a high profile due 
to extensive reports over the past year of gender-
based violence and harassment within multiple 
sectors, particularly in sport, the entertainment 
industry and in public life, with consequent high 
levels of media coverage and public interest in 
this area. Higher education policymakers remain 
concerned about issues of sexual misconduct 
among students within the sector, and have also 
expressed their interest in better understanding 
issues associated with staff-to-student harass-
ment. Additionally, there is a continued commit-
ment to engage with race, religious and ethnic-
ity-based harassment alongside [my emphasis] 
sexual harassment and gender-based violence. 
Other lobbying and campaign groups are also 
making an active contribution in this area.52
As emphasised above, The follow-on re-
port turns ‘harassment’ into explicitly ‘faith-
based harassment’, and notes that all forms of 
harassment should be addressed ‘alongside’ 
(presumably meaning with equal vigour) acts 
of ‘gender-based violence’ (which has now be-
come more inclusive, and not solely reserved 
for violence against women).
52 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 
16. ‘UUK/Pinsent Guidance’ refers to their joint docu-
ment, Guidance For Higher Education Institutions How 
To Handle Alleged Student Misconduct Which May Also 
Constitute A Criminal Offence (October 2016); available 
at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/
reports/Documents/2016/guidance-for-higher-education-
institutions.pdf [last accessed 21 October 2018]. This docu-
ment utilises the umbrella phraseology of ‘violence against 
women, harassment and hate crime’ throughout.
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The report makes one explicit reference to 
‘Islamophobia’, which is a quotation from a 
Students’ Union Officer at a large post-1992 
institution: ‘It is hard to know what the issues 
are – we really don’t know if there is Islamo-
phobia or anti-Semitism on campus. We would 
like to know this.’53 This example is grouped 
together with a Student Union Officer who 
reports an increase in disclosures, and a Stu-
dent Support Officer, who raises concerns as 
to what happens with the data enclosed in dis-
closures. The specific point is not addressed, 
and there are no mentions ways in which to 
tackle a demonstrable increase in xenophobia, 
nationalism or specific incidents pertaining to 
the UK’s rise in hate crime since the EU Ref-
erendum, despite the raising of this issue in the 
previous report. I would argue that this is a lost 
opportunity, to which I will return in Section 3.
The UUK follow-on report (in ‘Govern-
ance’) details ‘how far advanced providers are 
in meeting the Taskforce’s [2016] recommen-
dations’:
However, only a small minority of providers 
in the sample report directly to the governing 
body on these aspects of student safeguarding. 
Project work in this area is often governed at a 
project specific level, rather than embedded in 
the existing governance structure of the institu-
tion, and in some instances, the working group 
or project team has been configured in an ad hoc 
way and is not part of formal governance struc-
tures. Often, the level of funding for additional 
resources is not high enough to require approv-
al by the governing body. More commonly, the 
senior sponsor of the initiative or the chair of 
the working group will simply report on pro-
gress to a sub-committee of the governing body 
or of the academic board.54
These concerns over factors inhibiting any 
progress towards a tangible and meaningful 
change in culture also extend to ‘Involving 
Students’:
Student voices tend to be collated through the 
design of campaign materials, performance as 
part of events, surveys in partnership with oth-
er institutions and internal surveys and focus 
groups comprising of participants with pro-
tected characteristics. There was little evidence 
53 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 38.
54 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 28.
of the direct voices of victims/survivors of in-
cidents of sexual misconduct and hate crime 
feeding into the development of preventative 
campaigns or new reporting and support ar-
rangements, although most providers have es-
tablished partnerships with expert referral or-
ganisations and the police and seek their advice. 
Many interviewees commented on the challenge 
of seeking the direct input of survivors into pre-
ventative and responsive approaches due to the 
highly sensitive nature of their experiences.55
This suggests that a nationwide strategy to 
examine the root causes and response mech-
anisms (for witnesses as well as victims) that 
could bring about real change through collabo-
ration across university governance, in conjunc-
tion with the teaching staff and student body, re-
mains a long way off. Was one year too quick a 
response time to witness any tangible improve-
ment in tackling hate speech and crime?
To answer this question, it would be useful 
to compare Universities UK’s follow-on report 
with that created by the UK government to its 
own 2016 report on tackling hate crime, not 
least because the UUK’s report makes refer-
ence to it in its initial report. The government’s 
follow-on report, Action against Hate, took 
longer to update its findings, releasing them 
in 2018, allowing two years for recommenda-
tions to be implemented (compared to just one 
year for UUK). The government’s Hate Crime 
Action Plan attempted to tackle hate crime in 
society in response to the devastating impact 
‘on its victims, their families, communities 
and wider society’.56 It was perceived to be so 
significant a problem within UK society, that it 
was assessed in isolation. Its follow-up report 
is part of an on-going strategy (in this instance, 
part of a four-year programme), which details 
five themes: 1) preventing hate crime by chal-
lenging beliefs and attitudes; 2) responding to 
hate crime within our communities; 3) increas-
ing the reporting of hate crime; 4) improving 
support for victims of hate crime; and 5) build-
ing our understanding of hate crime.
The key phraseologies that distinguish this 
report from the tripartite approach taken by 
55 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, p. 30.
56 HM Government, Action Against Hate: The UK Govern-
ment’s plan for tackling hate crime – ‘two years on’ (Sep-
tember 2018); available at: https://assets.publishing.service. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/748175/Hate_crime_refresh_2018_FINAL_WEB.
PDF [last accessed: 20 October 2018].
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UUK is that the Hate Crime Action Plan ex-
plicitly details and provides for ‘challenging 
beliefs and attitudes’ and ways in which to 
understand what lies at the root of hate crime. 
As such, the 2018 Action Against Hate report 
details ‘perpetrator motivations’ for undertak-
ing hate crime: Section 3.v seeks to raise the 
importance of understanding motivation as a 
means to responding to and preventing hate 
crime.57 The UUK report and case studies dis-
cuss various crimes motivated by hate, without 
embedding the additional layer of inquiry into 
what motivates the hatred that is then acted 
upon. And this is the essential difference be-
tween the UUK approach and that of the Gov-
ernment: those representing the UK’s research 
and teaching institutions do not propose under-
taking research into the motivators of hate as 
a means by which they can better understand 
how to prevent or deal with it. Why might this 
be so?
I suggest that this swerve away from the 
source of such problems revolves around per-
ceptions of ‘Freedom of Speech’ on campus 
and within wider society during and since 
2016, the year of the EU Referendum, the elec-
tion of Donald Trump, and the simultaneous 
mainstreaming of nationalist rhetoric. Previous 
events –such as those named above, including 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris– initiated a 
call to action by variance governance fora, in-
cluding Universities UK, and articulating con-
cerns about intolerance in the public sphere. In 
2005, a collaboration was undertaken between 
Universities UK, the Equality Challenge Unit 
and SCOP (now known as GuildHE: www.
guildhe.ac.uk), both of whom are involved in 
the Changing the Culture initiative. 
Their ensuing report, Promoting good 
relations: dealing with hate crimes and 
intolerance,58 tackles head on the role of uni-
versities in promoting citizens’ rights and chal-
lenging hate speech within our communities. 
This report makes a crucial observation: ‘by be-
ing places of debate universities are one of our 
most important pillars of civil society, and rep-
resent a safeguard against forces that divide and 
57 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, pp. 
19-20.
58 Universities UK, Promoting good campus relations: deal-
ing with hate crimes and intolerance (November 2005); 
available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-
analysis/reports/Pages/freedom-of-speech-on-campus.aspx 
[last accessed 22 October 2018].
undermine society.’59 It is these very forces –the 
motivators of hate speech and crime– which 
universities have a duty to examine and explain, 
not only to their student body and staff but to so-
ciety more widely. After all, as detailed above, 
‘[u]niversities are a microcosm of society and 
therefore affected by these same problems.’60 
If universities are prepared to tackle and ar-
ticulate the causes of hate speech, and not just 
the symptoms, the ‘knock-on benefits for wid-
er society’ espoused in the 2016 report could 
rise exponentially.61 Students educated in the 
reasons why hate speech happens have a better 
chance of tackling the root cause because they 
understand why people ‘feel’ disenfranchised, 
how they have been manipulated to fear and 
blame ‘others’ for their problems. And here we 
have two distinct levels of emotional response: 
those who have been misinformed and told un-
truths (or ‘fake news’) which have led them to 
hate others, and those whose racism has been 
engrained and established over a longer peri-
od, whose ‘opinions’ were merely reinforced 
by the rhetoric espoused by the likes of the 
Leave Campaign or the Trump administration.
We should not be helping students respond 
to hate speech only; we should seek means to 
empower them understand the available data 
and sources of mis- and dis-information, so 
that they can engage with others in ways that 
promote social cohesion, that assist their peers 
and their neighbours in (at the very least) com-
prehending the benefits of social cohesion, 
freedom of movement, and multiculturalism. I 
would argue that this initiative is what is lack-
ing in the otherwise extensive and laudable re-
ports Changing the Culture and Changing the 
Culture: One Year On. Change cannot truly be 
mastered if we do not identify, in particular, 
the online instigators of societal malady and 
provide people with access to skills and infor-
mation by which they can address them proac-
tively. We must seek and promote at the very 
least a meaningful, coordinated counternarra-
tive, supported by demonstrable facts, before 
an individual or group acts on the hatred en-
flamed. Universities can play their part in this.
Until universities collectively respond to 
the outpouring of hate instigated by the rise 
and empowerment of nationalist rhetoric in the 
UK (known to have risen) since the EU Ref-
59 Universities UK, Promoting good campus relations, p. 11.
60 See above, n. 31.
61 See above, n. 32.
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erendum, this societal problem will continue 
to haunt them. They must find a way to tackle 
head-on –in their own ‘microcosm’ communi-
ties– just why some people mistakenly corre-
late Freedom of Speech with the right to ar-
ticulate hate. Until this is addressed, we risk 
continuing simply to wade at the shores of a 
sea of societal disfunctionality in Higher Edu-
cation environments, as in society more wide-
ly. Blaming non-whites and ‘foreigners’ for the 
UK’s problems can be articulated but Freedom 
of speech is not the freedom to articulate hate 
without consequences. Universities can em-
power students in prevention –both on campus 
and in their wider circles– if theytackle these 
bigger issues collectively.
Academic analysis of how such empower-
ment can be deployed does exist for the school 
sector. Building upon Held’s 1997 theories of 
cosmopolitan democracy, by way of example, 
Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey have devel-
oped the concept of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ 
to be taught in schools, as a means of ‘strength-
ening democracy and enabling participation’.62
Universities UK have already issued an inci-
sive report on Freedom of Speech on UK cam-
puses in 2011. This report welcomes collab-
oration and engagement between universities 
and the Police, advocating for further ‘liaison 
in respect of ‘hate crime’ recording between 
police, universities and local authorities.’63 
This same report looks back to the aforemen-
tioned 2005 UUK report into Promoting good 
campus relations: dealing with hate crimes 
and intolerance, and what research and work 
is yet to be undertaken to support inclusive 
rhetoric and action.64 It is therefore perhaps 
surprising that the 2016 and 2017 reports into 
ways in which universities might change the 
culture surrounding violence against women, 
harassment and hate crime do not seek to build 
on their own, previous initiatives.
Changing the Culture.., One Year On does 
address the context for these three types of 
crime since 2016 (in Section 2.1.3). It does pro-
vide a useful summary of approaches to tack-
ling all three issues across England, Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. Whilst the report 
62 A. Osler and H. Starkey, ‘Extending the theory and practice 
of education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ in Educational 
Review 70 (2018): 31-40 (citation at 32). See also D. Held, 
‘Globalization and Cosmopolitan Democracy’ in Peace Re-
view 9 (1997): 309-14.
63 Universities UK, Freedom of speech on campus, p. 20.
64 See above, n. 57.
itself does not make explicit reference to best 
practice in the three areas explored, it does pro-
vide an online link to a supplementary Direc-
tory of Case Studies.65 This valuable directory 
details eight areas targeted for consideration:
 – Commitment from Senior Leadership 
and Ensuring an Institution-Wide Ap-
proach
 – Prevention of Incidents
 – Enabling an Effective Response: Re-
porting and Support Processes
 – Recording Incidents
 – Student and Staff Training
 – Effective External Relationships
 – Drawing on Good Practice
 – Online Harassment and Hate Crime
The 28 case studies provide tangible and 
important evidence of response and prevention 
strategies, which are outlined below in order to 
show the categories considered and the institu-
tions involved. 66
The full text of these case studies provides 
a wealth of detailed information about current 
practice in preventing and reporting violence 
against women, harassment and hate crime. 
Sadly, the commissioned studies miss the 
opportunity to articulate and explore further the 
instigators of increased hate crime since 2016. 
None of them explore the ways in which hate 
for others is fuelled and magnified in an age of 
mass media –beyond its occurrence in social 
media. In this respect, Case Study 8 (Middlesex 
University– Awareness Raising and Toolkit) 
does acknowledge the role played by social me-
dia in disseminating positive responses which 
tackle hate crime and its impact. Section 3.8 
(‘Strategies for online harassment’) in Chang-
ing the Culture… One Year On does provide 
comprehensive information on how to respond 
to such harassment in a university context.67
By comparison, the Government’s Action 
Against Hate follow-up report (2018) details 
provision for greater understanding of the dan-
gers posed by online platforms and by mis-
65 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: Responding to Cases 
of Violence Against Women, Harassment and Hate Crime af-
fecting University Studies. Directory of Case Studies (July 
2017); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-
and-analysis/reports/Documents/2017/changing-the-culture-
harassment-case-studies.pdf [last accessed: 21 October 2018].
66 Universities UK, Directory of Case Studies, pp.1-2 (Contents).
67 Universities UK, Changing the Culture: One Year On, pp. 
44-45.
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information spread via off- and online news 
sources. Their report emphasises the impor-
tance of ‘[c]hallenging prejudice in wider so-
ciety, including the media’ and declares their 
commitment to ‘build[ing] our understanding 
of hate crime to ensure our policy can respond 
flexibly to challenges and concerns’. 
These wider activities, aimed at challeng-
ing prejudice, include direct assessment of the 
UK’s media as a source of misinformation and 
harbinger of hate-motivated crime: 
Given the media’s role in influencing wider 
society, the Ministry of Housing, Communi-
ties and Local Government will work with the 
Society of Editors, the Media Trust and the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation to 
update the ‘Reporting Diversity’ booklet. We 
will also continue our cooperation with the In-
dependent Press Standards Organisation and the 
Cross Government Working Group to Tackle 
Anti-Muslim Hatred to devise training to help 
journalists have a better understanding of Islam. 
We aim to deliver these outputs by 2020.68 
So how might universities undertake some-
thing comparable? The short answer is that ex-
tensive research on ways to tackle media com-
plicity in the promotion of hate speech already 
exists, and could therefore be incorporated into 
studies, such as those undertaken by Universi-
ties UK. The following Section considers ex-
empla of recent studies (some of which have 
come into print after the release of Changing 
the Culture: One Year On), and how they might 
assist future large-scale explorations of hate 
speech in UK society. It also explores the ram-
ifications of what might be gained and what 
issues might arise by utilising such academic 
research in wider society and within student 
cohorts. Finally, it considers academic analy-
sis of why we should be cautious of govern-
ment initiatives to curb the airing of prejudicial 
views by English citizens in particular.
3. Educating the English – creating 
awareness of the root causes of hate speech 
and ‘othering’.
So far we have explored only peripheral con-
siderations of the concept of ‘othering’ and 
how it relates to hate speech and crime in a 
68 HM Government, Action Against Hate, p. 12.
UK context. ‘Othering’ is the term used for 
rhetorical strategies that seek to differentiate 
between one group who perceive themselves 
as superior to ‘others’, who are not like them. 
The technique is engaged as a means by which 
to oppress and discriminate against these ‘oth-
er’ groups. Usually this involves differentiat-
ing by race, nation, gender, culture, religion, 
or a combination of all of these characteristics. 
‘Othering’ has existed in the ‘media’ of word 
and image since the rise of the European press 
in the late fifteenth century, and even earlier 
through manuscripts and visual and aural en-
tertainments (such as drama and song). It is 
not a new phenomenon. Early modern studies 
proliferate with analysis of English promotion 
of ‘othering’ on the stage and page, and my 
own recent research has sought to draw paral-
lels between early modern (from the period c. 
1450-1750) and contemporary tactics to por-
tray English Christian men and women as su-
perior to any other race or creed.69 The context 
may have changed but the rhetoric strategies 
and motivations resonate across the centuries.
So how do those who dislike –or hate– 
non-English races in a UK context define this 
hatred? What motivates or reinforces these 
opinions? Section I.2 (The Media and Hate 
Crime) above details proven correlations be-
tween ‘othering’ in the British Press, the Leave 
Campaign, and hate crime in British society. 
Elsewhere, academic study has considered 
the concept of White British as ‘normal’, oth-
er identities as ‘abnormal’, and the ways in 
which such rhetoric has fuelled hateful speech 
and action. Henk Van Houtom and Rodrigo 
Bueno Lacy’s important study of the lexis of 
‘normality’ clarifies this correlation – particu-
larly within an English setting.70 In their exam-
ination of the lexis of Brexit, Van Houtum and 
Bueno Lacy make an important observation: 
‘What is considered to be the norm and thus 
‘normal’ is crucially dependent on the notion 
of normality and thus on the incompatability 
against which normality necessarily defines 
itself.’71 
69 E. Evenden-Kenyon, ‘Teaching European Early Modern 
Drama After the EU Referendum: the Impact of Brexit on 
Pedagogic Approach’ in a Special Edition of English: Jour-
nal of the English Association, ed. Paul Frazer and Harriet 
Archer, vol. 68, Issue 261 (Summer 2019): 106-11.
70 H. Van Houton and R. Bueno Lacy, ‘The political extreme 
as the new normal: the cases of Brexit, the French state of 
emergency and Dutch Islamophobia’ in Reflections: Ex-
treme Geographies, Fennia 195 (2017): 85-101.
71 Van Houton and Bueno Lacy, ‘The political extreme’, p. 87.
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In an English context, they eviscerate the 
Leave Campaign’s claims to be ‘taking back 
control’ of normal (read: White English) iden-
tity, values and borders as a ‘curious blend of 
postcolonial grievance and imperial nostalgia’:
The post-colonial grievance was recurrently 
evoked through the repetitive discourse of po-
litical emancipation. Nigel Farage – perhaps 
the UK’s most famous exponent of xenopho-
bia and Euroscepticism – and Boris Johnson 
– London’s previous mayor turned prominent 
Eurosceptic – referred to the referendum’s date 
as ‘our independence day’.72 This is an unex-
pected metaphor. Narratives of unjust oppres-
sion redressed through independence constitue 
the central trope of former colonies’ national 
mythologies as well as the historical outrage 
fuelling decolonial theories.73 Hence, it is sur-
prising to find the same postcolonial grievances 
in the mainstream discourse of a country that is 
perhaps the epitome of European imperialism.74
One can see why citing such research might be 
‘problematic’ for university Vice Chancellors in 
the present age of ‘Research Excellence Frame-
work’75, ‘Teaching Excellence Framework’76, and 
72 Here they cite: BBC News (24 June 2016), ‘EU referendum: 
Farage declares “independence day”’; available at: http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36613295 
[last accessed 28 August 2018]; J. Stone, The Independent 
(21 June 2016), ‘Boris Johnson says Thursday could become 
Britain’s ‘independence day’’; available at: http://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-boris-john-
son-independence-day-live-debate-bbc-vote-leave-brexit-
remain-a7094531.htmp [last accessed 28 August 2018].
73 Here they cite: F. Fanon, The wretched of the Earth (Paris: 
La Découverte/Poch, 2017); W. Mignolo, The darker side 
of the renaissance: literacy, territoriality, & colonization 
(Ann Abor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1992).
74 Van Houton and Bueno Lacy, ‘The political extreme’, p. 91.
75 The Research Excellence Framework is the successor to the 
Research Assessment Exercise (2008), and is an impact eval-
uation, which assess the research undertaken in British Higher 
Education institutions. The REF is undertaken by the four UK 
Higher Education funding bodies: Research England, the Scot-
tish Funding Council, the Higher Education Council for Wales, 
and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland. See: 
https://www.ref.ac.uk/ [last accessed 22 October 2018].
76 ‘The Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Frame-
work’ (TEF) has been introduced by the Government in Eng-
land to recognise and encourage excellent teaching in uni-
versities and colleges.’ HM Government, ‘Teaching Excel-
lence Framework (TEF) – what you need to know’: https://
www.ucas.com/undergraduate/what-and-where-study/
choosing-course/teaching-excellence-framework-tef-what- 
you-need-know [last accessed 22 October 2018]. See also 
HM Government, Office for Students, ‘What is the TEF?’: 
https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/
teaching/what-is-the-tef/ [last accessed 22 October 2018].
the recent introduction of the UK Government’s 
Office for Students.77 Governments do not like to 
be reminded of historic injustices – particularly in 
the wake of the recent Windrush Scandal.78 But 
such research cuts to the heart of how and why 
‘othering’ and hate speech occur. It also identifies 
those who are complicit in such rhetoric.
On the issue of Brexit as an instigator of 
increased xenophobia and Islamophobia,Van 
Houtum and Bueno Lacy also raise some un-
comfortable truths that strike at the heart of UK 
academia’s relationship with its Government:
The referendum was started by David Cameron, 
a liberal pro-EU Prime Minister who, by his own 
choice, decided to put the UK’s EU membership 
to a referendum whose validity he did not even 
take the care of condition to either a representa-
tive voter turnout or a qualified majority. Camer-
on’s promises to reduce immigration and to hold 
a referendum on the UK’s permanence in the EU 
were his ways of appeasing populist xenophobes 
as well as Eurosceptics within his own party.79
Their assessment is both fearless and ac-
curate. The Leave Campaign won by tapping 
into the grievances of a ‘silent majority’ – who 
resented multiculturalism – and gave them a 
voice through which to air their hostility to-
wards non-White British citizens, immigrants, 
and, especially, Muslims, who are seen as hav-
ing been allowed to infiltrate British borders. 
The irony is: the UK always has had control of 
its borders under Article 7 of the EU Citizen’s 
Rights Directive, which enables member states 
to curb immigration; successive British gov-
ernments have simply chosen not to enact it, 
and until now, UK universities have ultimately 
benefited from such decisions, at both a staff 
and student level.80 The UK government has de-
monstrably continued to apply certain aspects 
77 The Office for Students is a non-departmental public body 
of the Department for Education, and acts as the regulator 
and competition authority for the Higher Education sector 
in England. It was established by the Higher Education and 
Research Act in 2017, and came into existence on 1 January 
2018. See: https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/about/ [last 
accessed 22 October 2018].
78 See The Week (2 November 2018), ‘Who are the Windrush 
generation and how did the scandal unravel?’: https://www.
theweek.co.uk/92944/who-are-the-windrush-generation-
and-why-are-they-facing-deportation [last accessed 4 No-
vember 2018].
79 Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy, ‘The political extreme’, p. 94.
80 See Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7 – Right of Residence: 
www.eearegulations.co.uk/CitizensRightsDirective/By-
Page/Article_07 [last accessed 4 November 2018].
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of this rhetoric, particularly when referring to 
citizens from the other 27 EU states residing 
in the UK.81 Since the policies towards EU na-
tionals impact significantly on the UK Higher 
Education’s own staff, it is little wonder that 
research into the lexis of government makes for 
challenging reading in certain quarters.
4. Conclusion 
As I write this, the UK remains in what Mike 
Finn has usefully coined ‘the Brexit moment’: 
a juncture at which understanding the impact of 
English isolationism (past and present) affords 
opportunities for assessing how and what we 
research and teach, and for thinking about how 
students respond to, interpret, and contextualize 
political language and texts.82 As such, I argue 
that there is an interior layer missing from the 
arguments detailed above, as to who can contrib-
ute to the tackling and prevention of hate speech 
in university settings. There is an (over?) empha-
sis on university management, welfare services, 
and students, which negates the extensive work 
being undertaken by and the resources available 
amongst the academics who actually teach and 
engage with students on a regular basis. In es-
sence, some do not need to be commissioned per 
se; they are already doing this work.
Universities could and should look to their 
own and other Humanities and Social Science 
departments to assist in these initiatives by 
helping others understand the causes of hate 
speech, so that we can all better prevent and 
combat it – both on and off campus. As with the 
concept of cosmopolian citizenship posited by 
Osler and Starkkey (cited above), this ‘Brexit 
moment’ presents both the UK’s government 
and universities with an opportunity: to add 
methodologies for understanding and debunk-
ing the rhetorical strategies of hate speech to 
the extensive (and otherwise impressive) se-
ries of case studies being undertaken– not least 
by Universities UK and the UK Government. 
In some instances, this requires self-analysis.
81 N. Sigona, ‘Theresa May’s dog-whistle rhetoric on EU cit-
izens jumping the queue…’ (‘University of Birmingham 
Research Perspectives’); available at: https://www.birming-
ham.ac.uk/research/perspective/theresa-mays-rhetoric-on-
eu-citizens-jumping-the-queue-and-its-effects.aspx [last 
accessed 10 November 2018].
82 Mike Finn, British Universities in the Brexit Moment. Polit-
ical, Economic and Cultural Implications (Bingley: Emer-
ald Publishing, 2018).
My own work advocates for a genuine ex-
ploration and partnership between teaching 
academics and students in a university setting. 
Great emphasis is laid upon the National Stu-
dent Survey (NSS: https://www.thestudent-
survey.com/) in English institutions because it 
has ramifications for institutional funding, and 
feedback from the Student Union is, of course, 
vital. Yet there remains space in the discussions 
about hate speech within society and within 
university communities for greater action in 
response to concerns raised by students. (The 
quoting but lack of specific response to student 
concerns raised above is a case in point.)83
Because much early modern English dra-
ma engages with a range of salient cultural and 
political tropes (othering and the language of 
empire), my recent pedagogic study scrutinised 
these tropes as useful vistas for classroom dis-
cussion and skill acquisition. English literary 
history became a means by which to facilitate 
student-led comprehension and discussion 
about recent political developments, not least 
the language of Brexit. More importantly, I ad-
dressed these issues within the university class-
room precisely because students had raised 
these concerns; they wanted a means by which 
to explore these issues safely, to understand the 
root causes and longevity of such language, 
and to gain the transferrable skills by which to 
tackle hate speech whenever they encountered 
it.84 Elsewhere, my research has examined faith 
demographics in the EU Referendum, the lexis 
of the Remain and Leave campaigns, and the 
demonising of ‘others’ in the UK press prior to 
and after 24 June 2016.85 My research is there-
fore targeted at – and includes – both the aca-
demic and student community.
As such, these are just some examples of 
methodologies for targeting the root causes 
of hate speech in an English setting. (This re-
search is explored in the pedagogic paper cited 
83 See Section II.1. 
84 Evenden-Kenyon, ‘Teaching European Early Modern Dra-
ma After the EU Referendum’, cited above, n. 68.
85 Elizabeth Evenden-Kenyon, ‘Understanding voter faith 
demographics in the UK’s EU Referendum and beyond’: 
initial findings presented at Faith in the Community Con-
ference, Rome, 22 November 2018. I am the UK Principal 
Investigator for the Religious Communities in European 
Civil Society Project, based at the Maecenata Institut für 
Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin. This report 
will be included in Volume II of the project’s published 
output in 2019. See: https://www.uni-erfurt.de/forschung/
forschungsprojekte/forschungsprojekte-religion/reli-
gious-communities-rc-and-civil-society-cs-in-europe/ [last 
accessed 4 November 2018].
144 Evenden, E. Pap. Eur. 32(2) 2019: 129-144
above; the teaching was undertaken at Brunel 
University in London.86) Others have been 
discussed elsewhere in this article. Any deal 
brokered between the UK Government and the 
other 27 member states of the European Union 
puts the United Kingdom at risk of total devo-
lution. Language matters. The concerns about 
a hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland illustrates the risks involved.87 Re-
search that identifies any hint of inflammatory 
language in the Houses of Parliament based in 
London (as distinct from the National Assem-
blies) will inevitably prove to be challenging 
reading for any university or government de-
partments intent on exposing such language at 
every level. But the practice of academia – and 
of governance – demands that we tackle the 
difficult questions, especially when they re-
quire introspection. 
86 See above, n. 68. I am grateful to Jo Lakey, Research Man-
ager at Brunel University’s College of Business, Arts and 
Social Sciences, for confirming permission to publish de-
tails of my teaching at the College, and to my students for 
their willingness to discuss their studies and insights with 
me for this publication. (I am also grateful to my students 
for voting and awarding me College Lecturer of the Year, 
and University Lecturer of the Year, 2016-17, for my peda-
gogic and pastoral approach during our work together.)
87 Gordon Anthony, ‘Brexit and the Irish Border: Legal 
and Political Questions’, The Royal Irish Academy and 
The British Academy Brexit Discussion Policy Paper 
(2017); available at: https://www.thebritishacademy.
ac.uk/sites/default/files/BrexitandtheIrishBorderLega-
landPoliticalQuestions_0.pdf [last accessed 4 Novem-
ber 2018].
